Wittgensteins 1913 Objections To Russells Theory of Belief: A Dialectical Reading :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Wittgensteins 1913 Objections To Russells Theory of Belief A Dialectical ReadingABSTRACT In what follows, I give (following Burton Dreben) a dialectical reading of his dismissal of metaphysics and of Wittgensteins objections to Russell in 1913. I fence that Wittgenstein essential be read as advocating no particular possibleness or doctrine that is, philosophy is an activity and not a body of truths. Furthermore, this public press is thoroughgoing. Put differently, a dialectical reading must be utilize to ones own thought and talk. Characteristically, this sort of dialectical philosophy begins with the question, Is there whatsoever definiteness to what I am doing in my own thinking and speechmaking? Such a question undercuts the easy assumption that what we are doing may be expressed in a body of meaningful statements. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein does not advocate either particular theory of nomenclature. A common reading of Wittgenstein is that he aims to prev ent us from misusing language. This trip up assumes that, for Wittgenstein, the notion of a correct, acceptable or meaningful employ of language may be taken for granted. In my view, Wittgenstein does not take the notions of use of language and grammar and its misuse for granted. For Wittgenstein grammar underdetermines what it is to use or misuse language. I argue that an ethical critique is implicit in Wittgensteins objections to any attempt to communicate a priori about language and thought. Distrust of grammar is the first requisite of philosophizing. Notebooks, p. 106.The solve of my talk this afternoon is to make clear what I shall call, following Burton Dreben, a dialectical reading of Wittgensteins dismissal of metaphysics in the context of his pre-Tractatus objections to Russells 1913 theory of belief.The early letters to Russell by Wittgenstein read naturally as presentations or proposals, to be read straightforwardly, as they stand. In this spirit, many authors inter pret Wittgenstein as rejecting Russell. s attempts to talk about the structure of language and facts, and, further, as insisting that any attempt to state the limits of language is itself nonsense. On such a reading, Wittgenstein is reacting to Russell. s realist attempts to analyze the structure of facts into constituents and the structure of propositions into names by eliminating certain unpatterned symbols. Wittgenstein relegates their pseudo-uses to what is shown in the use of propositions. Ricketts writes....Russell takes relations to be a type of social occasion they are constituents of facts, objects of acquaintance, and the designata of names.